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Abstract 
We introduce a simple generalization of Glrdenfors and Makinson’s epistemic entrenchment 
called partial entrenchment. We show that preferential inference can be generated as the sccp- 
tical counterpart of an inference mechanism defined directly on partial entrenchment. @ 1999 
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1. Introduction 
Preference is an important concept in knowledge representation. Whenever we aim 
to design a framework that does not depend solely on logical considerations, a possible 
way to incorporate extralogical information is to treat it as preference. Preference is 
subjective. Yet, preference is not based on a beyond analysis personal taste. If that 
was the case, it would have been pointless to seek a logic for preference. 
Preference is based on available information, both indirect (facts we learned and 
believed) and direct (facts we empirically verified). In many cases, we can assume 
that two persons who were exposed to similar information have the same preferences. 
If their preferences diverge, we look for a difference in their background knowledge 
and motives. What constitutes a basis of preference is beyond the scope of this paper 
but labeling on the basis of criteria as the above gives preference a social dimension. 
which in turn makes preference a basis of reasoning. 
What is the logic of preference? A simple but crucial first step has been made 
by Shoham [22, 231 with the introduction of preferential models. Preferential models 
are models equipped with a (non-reflexive, transitive) preference ordering. Models of 
this sort are not, strictly speaking, new as they can be reduced to Kripkc models or 
some other labeled order or relation. What is original is the nature of the preference 
relation. This relation seeks to maximize some function. To make this point clearer. let 
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us suppose we have some box emitting binary streams, it has emitted 000 until now, 
and we want to order two binary streams 0000 and 0001 according to our preference 
for its future behavior. Our first impulse would be to rank them equally, as both are 
possible. This is what we would do if we knew nothing about the box. However, some 
background information might make us choose one over the other, for example 0000. 
In both cases, (conditional) probability would prevail. On the other hand, if some profit 
is to be made by choosing the less probable 0001 then again our ordering would be a 
biased one. This preference would seek to maximize utility. 
The above discussion points implicitly to conditional information and therefore to 
nonmonotonic inference defined through preferential models. Indeed, what Shoham did 
is, by fixing a preferential model, to define: CI preferentially entails p iff B holds 
on all minimal models of CI under the preference relation. Preferential entailment is 
nonmonotonic as minimal models of a A y might differ from those of CI. The preferential 
model approach to nonmonotonicity is a semantical oasis in the overridden world of 
syntactic nonmonotonic formalisms. It should be pointed out, however, that preferential 
models have their roots in McCarthy’s [ 181 circumscription as the latter is a syntactic 
formalism of selecting the minimal models in a relation that prefers predicates with a 
smaller extension. 
The second important step was made by the subsequent work of Kraus et al. [ 1 l] 
when they showed that preferential entailment on models whose preferential relation 
satisfies the additional second-order property of smoothness or stopperedness is char- 
acterized by the system P (see Table 1 ), where a b p means CI preferentially entails /?. 
This result made a connection between the preferential model approach and work on 
(sceptical) nomnonotonic consequence operators introduced by Gabbay [6] and stud- 
ied by Makinson [16]. System P is a simple yet powerful sequent-like consequence 
relation that has been recognized [ 11, 171 as the strongest basis for nonmonotonic in- 
ference. Any system stronger than P is bound to be non-Horn and therefore lose some 
of its proof-theoretic content. However, apart from greatly diverging from the theory of 
(monotonic) logical consequence, preferential entailment has the additional defect of the 
inability of expressing credulous nonmonotonic inference, that is, to express extensions. 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a binary relation among sentences, called 
partial entrenchment, that has the feature of being monotonic and express extensions 
and show that any class satisfying system P can be generated as the intersection of 
those extensions. The subclass of partial entrenchments consisting of total preorders 
is Gardenfors and Makinson’s expectation orderings which characterize expectation 
inference [8] and Lehmann and Magidor’s rational inference [ 121. Restricting the class 
of expectation orderings with properties parameterized by theories one gets epistemic 
entrenchment, a well known class of linear preorders of sentences characterizing the 
AGM postulates for belief revision [l]. A further generalization of partial entrenchment 
led to a uniform characterization of all nonmonotonic inference relations [lo]. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we shall introduce partial entrench- 
ment, explain its function and compare its features with other approaches. In Section 3, 
we define a nonmonotonic consequence relation based on partial entrenchment called 
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Table 1 
System P 
(Supraclassicality) 
(Left logical equivalence) 
(Right weakening) 
(And) 
(Cautious monotonicIty) 
(Or) 
(Weak transitivity) 
maxiconsistent inference and prove some of its properties. Maxiconsistent consequence 
satisfies the properties of system P and, in Section 4, we show that once we restrict 
the class of partial entrenchment to an appropriate subclass we get a bijective corre- 
spondence. 
2. Partial entrenchment 
In this paper, we will not give a semantic account of entrenchment relations but a 
procedural one. We will now proceed with the formal definition of partial entrenchment. 
We will use a propositional language of atomic variables, denoted by Greek lower case 
letters X, /?, 7. etc., and closed under the usual propositional connectives 1 (negation), 
V (disjunction), A (conjunction), and + (tmphcatton). Entrenchment relations assume 
an underlying logic. We will use classical propositional consequence denoted with t. 
Such a choice is almost dictated by the choice of connectives and the theory we will 
develop but, in addition, our intention is to build non-classical reasoning on top of a 
classical one. This has the advantage of making our choices simpler and clearer. The 
set of consequences of a set of sentences X under F-, will be denoted by Cn(X) and 
we will write Cn(cc) and Cn(X, r) for Cn({r}) and Cn(X U {a}), respectively. 
Definition 1. A binary relation < on 9 is called a partiul entrenchment when it 
satisfies the following properties: 
1. if x</I and [j<y then X<Y (transitivity), 
144 K Georgatosl Annals of’ Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1999) 141-155 
2. if CI b /II then cc</?, and (dominance), 
3. if yda and y <p then 76~ A /II (conjunction). 
We write N<B for M<B but P~U. 
Partial entrenchment relations can be read as rules for extending theories and hence 
they approximate the epistemic state of a reasoner. However, this approximation is 
a particular one: specific information always overrides more general information. The 
meaning of a </II, where < denotes the partial entrenchment is 
CI can extend our theory provided we first extend it with p, 
So entrenchment encodes constraints on theory extensions. Therefore, entrenchment is 
a priority mechanism for building extensions: we shall consider only extensions that 
satisfy the entrenchment rules. The larger the extension the better. The reader can easily 
verify that our reading of partial entrenchment satisfies the above properties. 
Partial entrenchment can also be expressed as a consequence relation that extends 
classical logic. The main point here is that partial entrenchment respects neither dis- 
junction nor negation. 
We shall now describe informally how entrenchment gives rise to a nonmonotonic 
consequence relation, i.e., a conditional of the form CI b p. This paper is taking a 
different approach to entrenchment by defining inference directly on an entrenchment 
preorder. Here, the entrenchment relation becomes the primary basic notion and non- 
monotonic inference takes a secondary higher-order place much like any consequence 
relation given some underlying proof theoretic mechanism. Entrenchment is not a proof 
mechanism as it lacks truth functionality but is essentially a priority preorder encoding 
our preferences. Inference can be roughly described as follows: 
In order to evaluate a conditional c( iy p drop all sentences that could imply lc( 
and all sentences less than those. What remains are the sentences compatible with 
CI. Form all maximal consistent subsets and consider their intersection. Then CI L b 
holds if CI together with this set implies /I. 
Similar proposals for evaluating conditionals have a long history in the philosophical 
logic literature going back to Lewis [14] (see [4] for a relevant discussion). Entrench- 
ment is the mechanism for keeping track of this compatibility relation. A sentence is 
compatible with c( (we use coherent in Definition 2) if it is not less than la. This is 
also the main idea of Glrdenfors and Makinson. The novelty of our work is that we 
consider partial preorders and show that the same way of evaluating conditionals still 
applies, giving rise to preferential inference. As partial preorders give a multitude of 
possible maximal compatible sets we consider their intersection, that is a ‘sceptical’ 
sort of inference. 
Consider the following simple example. In Fig. 1, a path upwards from a to /I indi- 
cates that CI 6 p, where < denotes the entrenchment relation. The partial entrenchment 
of Fig. 1 says, for example, that i is less entrenched than all formulas, f is less 
entrenched than up, b + f and ,f - b, while f + b is less entrenched than p 4 b, 
p-~f and T. 
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-Lp--+b,p-++ 
Fig. 1. A (transitive) entrenchment relation. 
For instance, let us assume p and suppose we want to extend the classical theory of 
p, Cn(p) to a consistent theory. We can add any sentence to it, provided we do not 
add lp or any sentence implying lp. However, our entrenchment example says that 
apart from up and any sentence implying up we should exclude any sentence less than 
-p in the entrenchment relation. We shall see that the definition of entrenchment will 
ensure that up and all sentences stronger than up are less than up in the entrenchment 
relation. So we can use the entrenchment relation alone and exclude all sentences less 
than up. So we are left with {p + b, p 4 7 f, f + b}. We can add those to Cn( p) to 
form the extension Cn( p, b, 1 f ). 
Now, let us assume nothing but true sentences and see how we can extend Cn(0). As 
before, we should only exclude formulas less or equal to 1. In this case, we cannot 
consider together all sentences that are not less or equal to 1, because this set of 
sentences is inconsistent. However, we can choose consistent subsets from this set. We 
must only take care that such sets are upper closed so that they obey the entrenchment 
relation constraints. Further, we want to add as many sentences as possible so these 
sets must be maximal. There are two such upper-closed maximal consistent sets of 
sentences: one contains Tb and f - b and the other ,f and f --f b. Adding those to 
Cn(0), we can form two extensions: Cn(lb, -f, up) and Cn(b, f. -p). Therefore, it is 
possible to have more than one alternative for extending the theory of our assumptions 
leading to the well-known phenomenon of multiple extensions. 
Considering non-truth functional orderings of sentences while respecting conjunction 
is rather an old idea, going back to Schackle [20], and used in different disguises 
in works of Levi [13], Cohen [2], Shafer [21], Zadeh [25], Spohn [24], and Dubois 
and Prade [3]. The above authors use an ordering of sentences satisfying the partial 
entrenchment properties. However, they impose an additional constraint: 
for all c(, b E 9, either 01 d fl or /j < c( (Connectivity). 
146 K. Georyatosl Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1999) 141-155 
A partial entrenchment satisfying connectivity will be called connected. The important 
contribution of Glrdenfors and Makinson was to show that such connected preorders 
characterize exactly (not only define) expectation inference. Subsequently, the author 
showed that these orderings characterize also Lehmann and Magidor’s rational inference 
in [9]. The main contribution of this paper is showing that dropping the connectivity 
condition, the resulting class of orderings, that is, the class of partial entrenchment 
defined above, gives rise to preferential inference as a sceptical form of nonmonotonic 
inference. 
Lindstrom and Rabinowicz [ 151 were the first to propose dropping connectivity from 
the Gardenfors-Makinson connected entrenchment. Their epistemic entrenchment OY- 
derings form a subclass of partial entrenchment by satisfying additional postulates re- 
lated to a fixed theory and were used for describing a relational belief revision system. 
Their approach is slightly different to ours as they require an overall consistent en- 
trenchment. However, a common central idea of both approaches is that such relations 
point to more than one extension. 
The linear preorder that Gardenfors and Makinson introduced under the name of 
epistemic entrenchment had, apart from connectivity, two other important features: 
transitivity and dominance. Transitivity shows that we deal with a simple notion of 
transitive preference, while dominance shows that more specific sentences should be 
prefered over more general ones. These properties are the basic characteristics of en- 
trenchment and form also a part of the definition of partial entrenchment. 
There are at least two other previous proposals for characterizing nonmonotonic in- 
ference through some ordering of sentences. These are Michael Freund’s preferential 
orderings [5] and Hans Rott’s generalized epistemic entrenchments [19]. Both have a 
similar approach giving a correspondence with nonmonotonic consequence relations. ’ 
Both build on a syntactic condition that translates rational consequence relations to 
preorders. Hans Rott is using the Gardenfors and Makinson condition on belief con- 
tractions while Freund is using the condition CI <j iff a V p tV l/i’. In order to generate 
a preferential inference relation they use orderings that can be generated by a connected 
entrenchment: Freund is using the contrapositive [5, p. 2361 and Rott the complement 
of the inverse. Then they relax properties of the translated entrenchment. However, this 
approach leads to preorders that if, they are translated back to entrenchment would fail 
either Dominance in Freund’s case [5, property Pl, p. 2371 or Transitivity in Rott’s 
case [19, SEEI, p. 521. 
The loss of the above properties, that in a certain context can be legitimate, is not 
however the main difference between the work presented here and those proposals. 
Those proposals insist on generating consequence relation in a deterministic way given 
a preferential ordering. In a partial setting, preference gives rise to more than one 
alternative, that is, a multitude of most preferred possible situations and the process 
of inferring statements becomes nondeterministic. What Freund and Rott achieved is 
simulating nondeterminism in their orderings. Our framework, in contrast separates 
’ Strictly speaking, Rott is characterizing weaker than rational non-Horn belief contraction systems. 
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nondeterminism and classical connectives showing, in effect, the inadequacy of the 
latter to deal with the former. 
3. Maxiconsistent inference 
We shall now proceed to describe nonmonotonic inference through partial 
entrenchment. In defining inference, we shall make heavy use of negation, or better. 
of consistency. This is a very important point often overlooked by previous works 
on entrenchment. This is the only place where entrenchment makes effective USC of 
the underlying logic, in our case, classical logic. Inference, as illustrated in the above 
example, consists of two steps. First, we exclude all sentences less than the negation 
of our assumption. Second, we choose maximal, upper-closed, consistent, deductively 
closed sets of sentences that form our extensions. Adding to those extensions the clas- 
sical theory of our assumptions and closing under intersection yields the nonmonotonic 
theory of our assumptions. This procedure only makes sense for a finite set of assump- 
tions, as negation plays a central role in its definition, so the resulting nonmonotonic 
consequence relation is a subset of Y x Y. 
A partial entrenchment relation is clearly a partial preorder. A subset F of Y’ will 
bc called upper-closed iff r E F and 2 </? implies p E F. A subset F of Y will be 
called closed UN/U con+~~ction iff I, p E F implies u A /I E F. An upper-closed, closed 
under conjunction, proper subset F of 9, is a $lter. A filter F of the partial en- 
trenchment is also a filter of the Boolean-Lindenbaum algebra of k and, thcreforc. 
deductively closed, that is, Cn(F) = F. The converse is not true. A deductively closed 
F set might fail to be a partial entrenchment filter. However, the upper-closure 1 F 
of F is the least filter containing F. This fact is a consequence of Dominance and 
Conjunction. Principal upper closed sets are filters and deductively closed, that is, 
1 z=Cn(a). 
Given a partial entrenchment, we shall denote its set of filters with .E The space 
(.K c) is itself a complete semilattice with intersection as meet. It has also directed 
joins because if two filters are included in a third then the intersection of all filters 
containing their union is again a filter. This kind of partial order is often called a dcpo. 
Definition 2. Let G be a partial entrenchment. The set of cohrrenf sentences for a 
sentence c( E 2’ is the set 
Coh(cc) = {p / fi &~a}. 
The base of x is the set 
F(R) = {F 1 FE .q, F 2 Cob(a)}. 
The mcrsirml base of c( is the set 
-3,,,>,,,,,(x)={F 1FE.~(u), and ifF’t.Y(%) with F&F’ then F=F’}. 
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The extension set of c( is the set 
e(a) = {Cn(E a) I FE Fmax(~)). 
The sceptical extension of CI is the set 
E(a) = n e(a), 
and now define 
and say that CI maxiconsistently infers /I in the partial entrenchment 2 6. 
Note that 
FEY(U) iff TX@F iff TC@C~(F). 
Unless < equals 8 x 2, i.e. the inconsistent ordering, B is non-empty. As a corollary 
of Zorn’s lemma, every filter not containing ~CI is included in an element of gmax(a). 
Therefore, if p(a) is non-empty then &,,, (a) is non-empty. On the other hand, Y(E) 
can be empty, even though d is not inconsistent. This can only happen if p< TG(, for 
all /I E 9. In this case, we have that c( k 1. In fact, we have the following: 
e(a)=@ iff ne(a)=Y iff al-1 iff T<-cc. 
The following properties of bases will be useful in the subsequent proofs. 
Lemma 3. For all a, /I E 2 we have 
6) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
Proof. We have -/I l- ~CI which implies ~/?<~cr. This shows that if F is a filter and 
YX $! F then l/3 $4 F and we conclude Part (i). 
For the right to left direction of Part (ii), use Part (i) to show that I U 9(p) c 
P(aV /?). For the other direction, observe that if ~CXA -/I 6 F then either 7~14 F or 
l/I 6 F, since F is closed under conjunctions. Hence FE P(cI) U S(p) and we con- 
clude Part (ii). 
For the left to right inclusion of Part (iii), assume FE Fmax(cr V /?). Observe that 
FE 9;(z) implies FE Fmax(~), else there exists F’ E 9-,,ax(u) such that F C F’ and 
2 Filters have been employed by Lindshiim and Rabinowicz for defining multiple revision outcomes. In [15], 
our F(E) and 9&(a) are called fallbacks and maximal fallbacks of c(. 
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F #F’. We have F’ $8 .9,,,ax(a V fl), since F E &,ax(x V /?). So F’ @ 9(a), by Part (i), 
a contradiction. 
For the other inclusion, assume 
Let F’ E 9(x V j) with F 2 F’. We have either F’ E .9,,,ax(x) or F’ E .P,,,,,(jj). by 
Part (ii). In the first case, we have F E 9(z), as .9(a) is lower-closed, and this 
can only happen if FE (~~,,(cc)n~,,,ax(B))U(~,~ax(~)\.~(B)). So FE ,3&,(x) and 
F = F’. The other case is similar and, therefore, F E 9,,,ax(r V /e). 
Part (iv) is a straightforward corollary of Part (i ). 
Now, we turn to Part (v). By Part (iv), we have .9(x/\/j) C 9(r). If .p(x)= fl, 
we are done. Suppose that .9(x) # 8, and let F E 9(x). Further, let F’ E 3&ay(~) such 
that F 2 F’. By our hypothesis, we have F’, r k [j. Also, we have u - -/j G! F’. since 
otherwise lc( E F’. Therefore 1% V -/I $ F. Hence F E .P( r A [I). 
For Part (vi), suppose that M # fl then there exists F t .F,,,ilx(~) such that ~c( V -/i 4 F. 
Therefore, F E .F(c( A 8) and, since .9(x A /?) C.F(c1), F E 9,,,ax(~ A 8). The other di- 
rection is similar. i 
It is worth noting that from the algebra of sentences we moved to the algebra of 
theories and onto the algebra of the powerset of theories. The last algebra is of con- 
siderable interest as is the algebra pertaining to nonmonotonic inference. For example, 
we could dispense with maximal filters and study the lattice of the powerset of .JF 
directly. Our intention, however, is to introduce as little theory overhead as possible. 
We now have everything we need for characterizing preferential inference. However, 
we should first verify our claim that maxiconsistent inference is a preferential one. 
Theorem 4. GiLlen a partial entrenchment <, the consequence relation -:’ satisfies 
the q>stem P rides.. 
Proof. We verify the following list of rules: Supraclassicality, Left Logical Equiva- 
lence, Right Weakening, And, Cut, Cautious Monotony, and Or.’ 
For Supraclassicality, suppose that 3: k 7 then F, c[ k ;‘, for all F E 9,,,ax(x). 
For Left Logical Equivalence, suppose that r k /j and fit CI. By Lemma 3(i ) we 
have that .F,761naX(~) = Fm,,(fl). So, for every filter F E .9,,,ax(~) = .9,,,;,,(p), if F. x t ; 
then F, /j t ;‘. 
For And, suppose that F, c( t p and F, M t y, for all FE .P,nak(~). Then F, rt p A ;‘. 
For Right Weakening, suppose that for all F E ,9,,,z,x( a) we have F, u i- /j and /j t 1’. 
Then by (classical) Cut we get F, CY t y. 
For Cut, suppose that N b j and r A /I I.- y. Suppose that F E ,9,naw(~) then F. u k /I. 
By Lemma 3(v), we have &,x(a A /j) and, therefore, F. x A /j k ;‘. By (classical) Cut, 
we have F. x t 7. Hence c( 1, y. 
’ C‘ut is redundant. see [l I]. 
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For Cautious Monotony, suppose that CI b a and c( i- y, and let FE F,,,ax(a A /3). By 
Lemma 3(v), we have FE Pmax(a). Thus F, CY k y, and therefore F, x A p k y. Hence 
@AD? y. 
For Or, suppose that CI I- y and b b y, and let FE 9,rax(a V p). By Lemma 3(iv), 
there are three cases to consider: either (i) FE &,ax(a) n Fm,,(p), or (ii) F E Ymax(a) 
with F $! F(b), or (iii) F E Pm,,(/3) with F $! 9(x). In case (i), we have F, CI k y and 
F, p k y, so F, CY V /I t y. In case (ii), we have F, j3 k I, and therefore F, /j’ t- y. Again 
F,aVpl-y, as above. Case (iii) is similar. 0 
Given the above results we can now give a simple translation 
Rational Monotonicity. 
Lemma 5. Let 6 be a partial entrenchment. Then k~< satisjies 
of the property of 
UF< -B a c-G ’ 
aApt-< y 
(Rational Monotonicity) 
if and only if 
~,~,,(a)nP,,,,(~(~~)#0 and cc-+y~ nPmar(cc) implies 
aA/3+yE n%%&W. 
Proof. It is immediate by the definition of maxiconsistent inference and Lemma 3(vi). 
0 
A very natural subclass of partial entrenchments is the original class of connected 
entrenchments introduced by Gardenfors and Makinson [7, 81. This class was shown 
to be equivalent to the class of rational nonmonotonic consequence relations [9] under 
the following translation: 
a boa p iff either p 6 TM, for all /? E Y, 
or there is a PEY such that {/3) cc<fi}ta+y. 
It is easy to see, by Definition 2, that the above way through which a connected 
entrenchment gives rise to a nonmonotonic consequence relation is a special instance 
of the definition of maxiconsistent inference, that is, Cv, = lVo~ Now we can give 
an alternative proof of the fact that connected entrenchments give rise to rational non- 
monotonic consequence relations by showing that a connected entrenchment satisfies 
the property of Lemma 5. In fact, it satisfies a much stronger property as the following 
lemma shows. 
Lemma 6. If < is a connected entrenchment then 
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Proof. This is immediate because if < is connected then .Ji;maX(rx) is either a singleton 
or empty for all r E 9%. Cl 
Corollary 7 (Gardenfors and Makinson [IS]; Georgatos [9]). If’ < is u connrcted en- 
trmchmtw t then I-- G is a rational i@rence relation. 
In the next section we shall exhibit a class of non-connected entrenchment relations 
that satisfy the property of Lemma 5, and therefore give rise to rational inference rela- 
tions We leave open the question whether there is a simple first-order property of < 
that relaxes connectivity and still implies the property of Lemma 5. The above corol- 
lary shows why maxiconsistent inference makes partial entrenchment a generalization 
of the Gardenfors and Makinson original notion of entrenchment. It is well known that 
connected entrenchments not only give rise to rational inference but they are in bijec- 
tive correspondence as well. Given a rational inference relation N one can construct 
a connected entrenchment < with C- = wS using the translation below 
proposed in [9] which is a slightly modified version of the one proposed by Girdenforss 
Makinson for expectation inference relations (see [S]). In the case of partial entrench- 
ment relations the above translation no longer works. In the next section, an alternative 
way to generate entrenchment given a preferential inference relation will be presented. 
4. Reducing preferential inference to partial entrenchment 
In this section, we show that every preferential consequence relation can be expressed 
as a maxiconsistent inference of a partial entrenchment. The class of maxiconsistent 
inference relations is much wider than that of preferential inference. Maxiconsistent 
inference expresses sceptical nomnonotonic consequence by an intersection of possible 
extensions. Therefore, we can construct two different partial entrenchments assigning 
different sets of extensions for the same assumptions while still agreeing on the inter- 
section of the extensions. 
Given a preferential inference relation, we will construct a partial entrenchment with 
the same maxiconsistent inference. This construction will be canonical, in the sense that 
one can safely identify a preferential inference relation with the partial entrenchment 
constructed. The main idea is to construct a partial entrenchment with all possible 
extensions of the sceptical extension. This way their intersection will also provide 
the sceptical extension. It turns out that such partial entrenchments can be described 
syntactically by adding the following rule to Dominance, Transitivity, and Conjunction. 
For all x,/j, y E Y 
if x+/j’<-@ and a+?;< 1% then x --i (p V :’ ) < -c( (Weak Disjunction). 
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A partial entrenchment satisfying Weak Disjunction is called weakly disjunctive. The 
class of weakly disjunctive partial entrenchment is properly contained in that of partial 
entrenchments as the following simple counterexample shows. 
Example 8. Let D = {~$,4 V $ V x}, and define an ordering as follows: 
CC<P ifs BI-a implies BI-bp, for all BCD. 
The preorder 6 is a partial entrenchment. However, it is not weakly disjunctive, for 
q!~V$<c/) and 4Vx<$ but c$V$Vx<$. 
The main property of weakly disjunctive partial entrenchments is given in the fol- 
lowing proposition. 
Proposition 9. Let d be a weak disjunctive partial entrenchment. Then for all CI E 2 
and FE&,,,(~), either CX-+PEF or a-+~fi~F. 
Proof. Fix an a E $u and F E &,ax(a) and suppose CI --) /I +! F and a + l/j’ $2 F, towards 
a contradiction. As F is maximal in L~&~(LY), we have lc( E f(F U {LX -+a}). This 
implies that there exists cl E F such that sl A (a --) /3) d YI.. Similarly, there exists ~2 E F 
such that E~A(cI+~P)<~x. For E=E~ AE~ EF we have both cr\(~(+/?)<~a and 
E A (a + -8) <la. Now observe that (E A 1~) V (E A (a + /?)) is classically equivalent 
to E/I((CI--tp). so 
(&A~cc)V(EA(a+/?))d%. 
Also, we have 
(E/\%)V(EA(cr-+p))bE. 
So, by Conjunction, 
(EAlCI)V(t:r\(a--tB))dEr\~~. 
Similarly, 
(&/\~a)V(E/\(CI--tl~))6&A~CI. 
Applying Weak Disjunction on the last two, we have 
(EA~~)V(EA\~A~)~(E/\(C(~~))~EA~CI. 
Therefore 
(EA-CX)VE<E~\TX. 
Since E E (E A la) V E, we have 
E~((&~~CI)V&)~-Er\~C1~~a; 
a contradiction as E E F E Pmax(a). 0 
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Corollary 10. Let d be a weak disjunctive partial entrenchment. Then 
Proof. For the right to left direction, assume a lu c fl and M -+ -/I 6 1~. We have that 
a + p E F, for all F E p,,,ax(a), and GI + l/I E Coh(cc). We have Cn(r + l/3) C Coh(c(). 
Choose F E .Y&x(a) such that Cn(a + I/I) CF. However, F contains a + [II and there- 
fore TCI E F, a contradiction. Note that this direction does not use Weak Disjunction. 
For the left to right direction, assume 1~ V -fl <TX. We must show xbS [j. Let 
F E Fmmax(a). By Proposition 9, We have either r---f fi E F or cr --) -/I E F. We cannot 
have a--+~/l~F as CI--~~~<X so a-t/?~F. E 
We can go back and forth between a preferential inference relation and a partial 
entrenchment through a syntactic translation given in the following definition. 
Definition 11. Given a partial entrenchment d and a nonmonotonic consequence re- 
lation I- . then define a consequence relation lu ’ and a relation 6’ as follows: 
(N) XL ‘p iff ~ccV~p<~x, 
(P) x <‘/I iff 3 V -/I I-- 3. 
We shall denote I- ’ and <’ with N( < ) and P( I- ), respectively. 
Condition (P) is akin to a preorder defined in [l l] by r V fi N ‘x (see also Makinson’s 
comments in [17, p. 781). The maps defined in Definition 11 are inverses of each other. 
Lemma 12. Let d and I-- be a partial entrenchment and a prqferential irzfkrence 
relation, respectively. Then 
(i) P(N( d )) = <, and 
(ii) N(P( lu )) = b 
Proof. Let 6’ =P(N( <)). We have a<‘b iff ~c( V -/I N 7x, where N = N( < ). 
Now, we have 1~ V -fi I- ~a iff ~(lc( V -/I) V ~7 x < T(YC( V 7 gb), by definition. The 
latter holds iff (cz A /?) V c( < ct A p iff c( 6 c( A 8, by Dominance. Now, r < 2 A fl implies 
x < 8, by Transitivity, and CI < p implies a < c( A p, by Conjunction and Dominance. 
Let ~‘=IV(P(~-)). We have cci-‘/I iff xVT/?<X iff -(wV~fi)V~a;-V 
~(TCI V -/I) iff c( b a A ,!?, by Left Logical Equivalence, iff z t- p, by And, Right Weak- 
ening and Reflexivity. 0 
Now, combining Proposition 9 and Lemma 12 we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 13. !f YV is a preferential icference relation, then the relation < dqfined 
by (P) is a weakly disjunctive partial entrenchment relation such that. ,for all r, /i 
in A?. 
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Proof. We must only show that 6 is a weakly disjunctive partial entrenchment. 
For Dominance, suppose that al-b. Thus -bk ~CI, and so ~CI V -/I Cv TX. Hence 
x<P. 
For Transitivity, suppose that a <b and /3 6~. By the definition above, these trans- 
late to la V T/? b XY and -p V my i- l/j’, respectively. Further, the following rule is 
derivable in the preferential system P [l 1, Lemma 5.51 
So we have urn V my I-- TX Hence a < y. 
For Conjunction, suppose that y<~ and y<p. We must show that ydcl A p. Our as- 
sumption translates to 1~ V TX I- my and my V -/I b -y, respectively. Applying Or and 
Left Logical Equivalence, we get la V lb V ly b +y. so l(c( A fl) V ly b ly. Hence 
y<aAfi. 
For Weak disjunction, suppose CI -+ b d -IX and a + y G 1~. These translate to LX b l/3 
and CI I- 1~. By And, we have c( h -/? A ly. The latter translates to do + (p V y)dw~ 
as desired. 0 
We can now give a bijective correspondence between the class of rational nonmono- 
tonic consequence relations and weakly disjunctive partial entrenchments. It is enough 
to translate the property of Rational Monotonicity using P: 
CtV+?&: 
a ’ ’ ” 
ctV/3VydclVP 
(Splitting). 
Weakly disjunctive relations satisfying Splitting will be called rational. 
Corollary 14. Zf iv is a rational inference relation, then the relation 6 dejined by 
(P) is a rational weakly disjunctive partial entrenchment relation such that, for all 
(x, /I in 9, 
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